Namibia Tourism Information: Post-Colonial History

In 1949 South Africa granted the territory's white voters representation in the South African parliament. In 1950 the International Court of Justice (lCJ) ruled that South Africa was not competent to place the territory under the UN trusteeship system, nor able to alter the legal status of the territory unilaterally. In 1966 the UN General Assembly voted to terminate South Africa's mandate and to assume responsibility for the territory; a 'Council for South West Africa' was appointed in 1967, and in the following year the UN resolved that the territory should be renamed Namibia. The South African government, however, refused to relinquish the terriory's administration to the UN.

Political resistance was, meanwhile, taking hold within the territory. In 1957 the Ovamboland People's Congress was formed. It was subsequently renamed the Ovamboland People's Organisation, and in 1960 the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). Its leaders included Sam Nujoma and Herman (later Andimba) Toivo ja Toivo. From 1963 SWAPO meeting were effectively banned, although it remained technically legal organization. In 1966 SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), began an armed insurgency. In 1968 SWAPO restyled itself as the South West Africa People's Organisation of Namibia.

In 1971 the ICJ ruled that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that it should withdraw immediately, and in December 1973, the UN General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the 'authentic representative of the people of Namibia', and appointed the first UN commissioner for Namibia to undertake 'executive and administrative tasks'. South Africa's unsuccessful intervention in Angola in the second half of 1975 set the scene for the escalation of the Namibian armed struggle. With support from the pro-SW APO government in Angola, PLAN was able to establish bases close to the borders of Namibia. South Mrica reacted to this threat by greatly expanding counter-insurgency forces in the territory. South Africa, meanwhile, began to take initiatives on the political front. In September 1975 a constitutional conference was convened to discuss the territory's future. The Turnhalle conference, as it became known, designated 31 December 1978 as the target date for Namibian independence, and in March 1977 it produced a draft constitution for a pre-independence interim government. This constitution, providing for 11 ethnic administrations, was denounced by the UN and SWAPO, which issued its own constitutional proposals based on a parliamentary system with universal adult suffrage.

The UN 'Contact Group'

In January 1981 the UN convened a conference in Geneva, Switzerland, which was attended by SWAPO, South Africa, the DTA and other internal parties. The UN 'contact group' and the 'front-line' states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania Zambia and Zimbabwe) were present as observers. South Africa and the internal parties could not agree on a cease-fire date and the implementation of the UN plan. It was apparent that the South African prime minister, P. W. Botha, believed the SWAPO was communist-controlled and that it therefore could not be allowed to come to power. The DTA, for its part, required more time to establish itself as a credible alternative to 'SWAPO; the South Mrican government, meanwhile, hoped that the newly-elected Reagan administration in the USA would be Msympathetic to South African policy. Under US chairmanship, the 'contact group' resumed consultations with South Africa and SWAPO during 1981. In July 1982 constitutional guidelines were agreed to by the two parties, which provided that the post-independence constitution should include a bill of rights and be approved by two-thirds of the members of a constituent assembly. Although South Africa and SWAPO were unable to agree on whether the election should be conducted wholly on the basis of proportional representation, the UN secretary-general was able to report that all other points at issue had been resolved. By then, however, a more formidable obstacle to the implementation of the UN plan had arisen.

South Africa now insisted that the Cuban troops withdraw from Angola. This concept, known as 'linkage', was initiated in 1981 by the US government, which viewed the war in Namibia and southern Angola as a buffer against Soviet expansionism. This view was not shared by the other members of the 'contact group', particularly France, which eventually left the group in December 1983. The USA then continued the negotiations alone.

Within the territory, the DTA was seriously weakened in early 1982 by the effective loss of support from the Ovambo (the largest ethnic group in Namibia) other than SWAPO, After several months of dispute with the South Mrican government over the future role of the DTA, Mudge resigned as chairman of the ministerial council in January 1983, and the council itself was automatically dissolved. The administrator-general, in turn, dissolved the national assembly, and assumed direct rule of Namibia on behalf of the South African government.

Armed Conflict

Transitional Government and Popular Resistance

The credibility of the MPC was not high, owing to the past history of the DTA, the corruption and mismanagement of ethnic authorities under the control of MPC member parties, its failure to attract any Ovambo party, and its readiness to deal with South Africa. Aware of the lack of support for the MC, the South Mrican government sought to involve at least part of SW APO in an internal settlement. In March 1984 it released Toivo ja Toivo, who had been imprisoned in South Africa since 1968. A number of SW APO activists who had been detained since 1978 were also freed. In May 1984 formal talks were held in Lusaka between the administrator-general, SW APO and the internal parties, under the joint chairmanship of President Kaunda of Zambia and the administrator-general. SWAPO, however, insisted on the implementation of Resolution 435, and the talks ended in failure. The members of the MPC then proceeded with their own plans.

On 17 June 1985 the South African government installed a 'Transitional Government of National Unity' (TGNU) in Windhoek, pending independence, although the arrangement was condemned in advance by the contact woup governments and was declared 'null and void' by the UN secretary-general. This interim government consisted of a cabinet and a national assembly. Neither was elected, with appointments made from among the constituent parties of the MPC. A 'bill of rights', drawn up by the MPC, prohibited racial discrimination, and aconstitutional council was established, under a South African judge, to prepare a constitution for an independent Namibia. South Africa retained responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and internal security. The administrator-general used his power of legislative veto on several occasions. From 1985 a series of rallies by SW APO and its youth league were disrupted by the police. In July 1986, however, the courts ruled that SWAPO was entitled to hold public meetings.

Moves Towards Independence

At these negotiations, which began in London, United Kingdom, in May 1988, South Africa agreed to implement Resolution 435, providing that a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops could be agreed. By mid-July the participants in the negotiations had accepted a document containing 14 'essential principles' for a peaceful settlement, and in early August it was agreed that the implementation of Resolution 435 would begin on 1 November. South African troops were withdrawn from Angola by the end of August. The November deadline was not met, however, owing to dis agreement on an exact schedule for the evacuation of Cuban troops. In mid-November these arrangements were agreed in principle, although their formal ratification was delayed until mid-December, owing to South African dissatisfaction with verification procedures.

On 22 December 1988 South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed a formal treaty designating 1 April 1989 as the implementation date for Resolution 435. Another treaty was signed by Angola and Cuba, requiring the evacuation of all Cuban troops from Angola by July 1991. A further agreement established a joint commission to monitor the implementation of the trilateral treaty. Under the terms of Resolution 435, South African forces in Namibia were to be confined to their bases, and their numbers reduced to 1,500 by 1 July 1989; all South African troops were to have been withdrawn from Namibia one week after the election. A multinational UN observer force, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), was to monitor the South African withdrawal and supervise the election.

Implementation of the Un Independence Plan

The scheduled implementation of Resolution 435 was disrupted by large-scale movements, beginning on 1 Apri11989, of PLAN troops into Ovamboland. The South African government obtained Ahtisaari's aweement to the release from base of its forces, and more than 300 PLAN troops were reportedly killed in the subsequent fighting. The origins of the sudden and unanticipated conflict apparently lay in differing interpretations of the terms of the UN peace plan; SWAPO, excluded from the 1988 negotiations, relied on provisions under Resolution 435 for te confinement to base of PLAN combatants located within the territory on 1 April 1999, and it was widely claimed that the insurgents had intended to report to UNTAG officials. On 9 April the joint commission produced conditions for an evacuation of the PLAN forces; meanwhile, Sam Nujoma; president of SWAPO, ordered a withdrawal of PLAN forces to Angola. At a meeting of the joint commission on 19 May, the cease.fue was certified to be in force. In June most racially discriminatory legislation was repealed, and an amnesty was granted !4 1 Namibian refugees and exiles: by late September nearly 42,000 refugees, including Nujoma, had returned to Namibia. Mean-while, South Africa completed its troop reduction ahead of schedule. The pre-independence election was conducted peacefully in the second week of November 1989; more than 95% of the electorate voted. The 72 seats in the constituent assembly were contested by candidates from 10 political parties and alliances: representatives of seven parties and fronts were elected.

SWAPO received 57% of all votes cast and 41 seats, thus obtaining a majority of the seats in the assembly but failing !4 achieve the two-thirds' majority that would have allowed SW APO to draft the constitution without recourse to wider consultation. It was widely believed that SWAPO would have fared better had evidence not emerged during the election campaign of the torture and death in its camps in Angola of numerous people whom SWAPO had detained-as alleged by South Africa during the war. The DTA, with 28.6% of the votes, won 21 seats. The election was pronounced 'free and fair' by the special representative of the UN secretary-general. Following the election, the remaining South African troops left Namibia, and SW APO bases in Angola were disbanded.

SWAPO In Government

Following independence, Namibia became a member of the UN, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth Full diplomatic relations were established with many states, and partial diplomatic relations with South Africa. In May 1990 Angola and Namibia agreed to form a joint commission monitor their common border. However, relations became strained in February 1991 when Angolan aircraft bombed a northern Namibian village; the Angolan government claimed that it had attacked covert destabilization bases sponsored by South Africa, and promised to pay compensation to the Namibian government. With the resumption of the civil war in Angola in late 1992, the Namibian government remained concerned over the security of its northern border. Instability in South Africa also threatened to affect Namibia; the government was, therefore, much relieved when South Africa's first democratic election took place peacefully in April 1994.

In March 1990 Namibia became a full member of the Southern African Customs Union (having previously been a de facto member of that organization) and a member of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference SADCC), which sought reduce the dependence of southern African states on South Africa. In August 1992 Namibia joined the other SADCCmembers in recreating the organization as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to which South Africa was admitted in August 1994.

In April 1990 a team of British military advisers arrived in Namibia to assist in training the new Namibian Defence Force comprising former members of both PLAN and the SWATF & E September several ex-members of the national police force and of the disbanded pre-independence paramilitary force, Koevoet, were charged with high treason, following the discovery of a weapons cache. The appointment, in October, of the former SWAPO head of security, Maj.-Gen. Solomon Hawala, as commander of the army caused protest among opposition groups, owing to allegations that he had been implicated in the torture and detention of dissidents prior to Namibia's independence.Although the opposition in the national assembly continued to raise the matter from time to time, the government refused to agree to an investigation of events that took place during the struggle for independence. Allegations of past violations of human rights by SWAPO have remained a sensitive political issue.The disclosure by the South African government in July 1991 that it had provided some R100m. in funding to the DTA and other anti-SWAPO political parties during the 1989 election campaign added to the DTA's post-independence problems. In November 1991 the DTA, formerly a coalition of ethnically-based interests, reorganized itself as a single party, but its support continued to dwindle. In late November and early December 1992 the first elections were held for the country's 13 regional councils and 48 local authorities. SW APO won nine regional councils while the DTA won only three (in the remaining council there was no clear majority). SWAPO thus secured control of the newly-established second house of parliament, the national council, which comprised two members from each regional council; it began work in May 1993. In June Dirk Mudge, the leading figure in the DTA, resigned from the national assembly and subsequently retired from public life. The DTA repeatedly publicized examples of alleged maladministration and financial extravagance (the most controversial example being the purchase of a presidential aircraft during a period of severe drought), but these efforts failed to revitalize popular support for the DTA. Walvis Bay, the 1,124-sq km enclave that contains the region's only deep-water port facilities, had remained under South Mricanjurisdiction after Namibian independence. Negotiations between the South African and Namibian governments led to the announcement in August 1992 that a Walvis Bay Joint Administration Authority (JAA) would be established, comprising an equal number of representatives from each country.

The JM began operating in November that year. In August 1993, following pressure from the African National Congress of South Mrica (ANC), South Africa's multi-party negotiating forum resolved to transfer sovereignty ofWalvis Bay to Namibia.Some white residents of the enclave resorted unsuccessfully to legal action in an attempt to block the transfer. The work of the JAA was completed in February 1994, and from the beginning of March the enclave was formally incorporated into Namibia. Namibia's first post-independence presidential and legislative elections took place on 7-8 December 1994, and resulted in overwhelming victories for Nujoma and SWAPO. Nujoma was elected for a second term as president, securing 76.3% of the votes cast; his only challenger was Mudge's successor as president of the DTA, Mishake Muyongo. SWAPO secured 53 of the elective seats in the national assembly, obtaining 73.9% of the valid votes cast. The DTA retained 15 seats (with 20.8% of the votes), and the coalition United Democratic Front two.

The remaining two seats were won by the Democratic Coalition of Namibia (DCN, an alliance of the National Patriotic Front and the German Union) and the Monitor Action Group. SWANU, which had been a founder member of the DCN in August, but subsequently withdrew to contest the elections in its own right, failed to secure representation in the legislature.Although SW APO thus had a two-thirds' majority in the national assembly, Nujoma gave assurances that no amendments would be made to the constitution without prior approval by national referendum. The success of Nujoma and SWAPO was, in part, attributed to the popularity of land reform legislation recently approved by the national assembly. Nujoma was sworn in for his second presidential term on 21 March 1995. The previous day, as part of a major reorganization t of cabinet portfolios, he assumed personal responsibility for me affairs and the police, in what was interpreted as an to curb an increase in crime and discontent within the force. Geingob remained as prime minister, with Hendrik Witbooi, previously minister of labour , public services and man-power development, as his deputy.In March 1996 the publication of Namibia: The Wall of Silence, a book by German Pastor Siegfried Groth, a former SW APO supporter, describing the detention and torture of people by the organization during the 1980s, caused much controversy. Nujoma publicly denounced the book as an attempt to discredit SWAPO, and accused its promoters of endangering national reconciliation. Nujoma and his party were, in turn, accused of failing to admit to, and apologize for, the alleged human rights violations in the SW APO camps in Angola. SW APO subsequently published a book, entitled Their Blood Waters Our Freedom, listing about 8,000 SWAPO supporters who had died during the war. However, a 'breaking the wall of silence' comittee continued to accuse the party of failing to acknowledge the alleged atrocities in its camps. When the South African truth and reconciliation commission (see the chapter on South Africa) requested permission to conduct hearings in Namibia in 1997, it was refused, on the grounds that the public discussions might hinder Namibia's own search for reconciliation.

In May 1997, at SWAPO's second party congress since independence, the most intensive debate was on land reform, with the congress urging the government to expedite measures in that area. An important resol11tion endorsing the proposal that Nujoma should seek re-election for a third term as president was justified on the grounds that Nujoma had initially been chosen by the constituent assembly, and had only once been elected president on a popular mandate. Witbooi, who had been vice-president of the party since 1983, was re-elected to the post, defeating a challenge by Geingob. The minister of fisheries and marine resources, Hifikepunye Pohamba, replaced Moses Garoeb as secretary-general of the party. In a minor reshuffle of the cabinet in December, Pohamba was appointed minister without port-folio.Increasing discontent with the SW APO government was reflected in the outcome oflocal elections conducted in February 1998. Only 34% of the registered voters participated in the ballot, the lowest figure since independence. Voter participation was particularly low in the north of the country, traditionally an area of strong support for SWAPO. The ruling party retained control of 27 of the 45 councils contested, but lost two to its nearest rival, the DTA, which won nine. Critics continued to accuse SWAPO of autocratic practices and various abuses of power. Investigations into allegations of corruption were protracted, and the government often failed to punish those involved. The proposed purchase of a new presidential aircraft prompted much criticism in 1997, which, however, the government was able to disregard. Both the press and the judiciary were attacked by SWAPO supporters who opposed their independence, while efforts to establish new anti- SW APO parties attracted little popular support. The dominant trend was to increase the concentration of power in the SWAPO elite.

Regional Concerns

In August 1996 Namibian and Angolan officials agreed on further measures to increase border security. In 1996 Namibia and Botswana referred their dispute over the demarcation of their joint border on the Chobe river (specifically, the issue of the sovereignty of the sparsely inhabited island of Kasikili-Sududu) for adjudication by the ICJ. In December 1997 a new dispute began concerning two further islands, Setungo and Luyondo, when Botswanan soldiers allegedly harvested crops planted on the islands by Namibian villagers. In May 1998 the two countries signed an accord establishing a joint technical commission to demarcate their joint border on the Chobe river. Following the change of government in South Africa, President Mandela visited Namibia in August 1994 and indicated the possible cancellation of Namibia's pre-independence debt to South Africa (estimated at N$ 826.6m. in 1990), which Namibia was to have repaid with interest in annual instalments during 1995-2012. Shortly before Namibia's elections in December 1994, Nujoma again met Mandela in South Africa, and the South African president announced that the entire debt would be cancelled. However, when technical experts from the two countries met to discuss the practicalities, they were unable to agree. The issue was given priority during Nujoma's first state visit to South Africa in May 1996, and by August of that year it was reported that the difficulties had been resolved. Legislation providing for the cancellation of the debt was subsequently adopted by the South African parliament. When he addressed the South African parliament on his state visit to Cape Town, Nujoma appealed for South African investment in Namibia; however, few such funds were forthcoming.

In August 1998, apparently without first consulting his cabinet, or the legislature, President Nujoma ordered the dispatch of Namibian troops in support of President Laurent-Desire Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against rebel forces supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Within weeks almost 2,000 Namibian troops were fighting in the DRC alongside troops from Angola, Zimbabwe (and, at that time, Chad), helping to secure the Matadi corridor from Kinshasa to the sea. However, the military involvement in the DRC was not popular within Namibia. Within six months the cost of the operation was in excess of N $100m. Although Nujoma asserted that Namibian involvement was an act of solidarity and support for the territorial integrity of the DRC in the face of external aggression, many observers considered that he hoped participation in the war might mean that Namibia would be well-placed to benefit from future mineral exploitation in the DRC. There were also rumours that the authorities were concealing the number of Namibians who had died in the conflict. In May 1999 Geingob conceded that the government had not given adequate information, and later that month the national assembly was informed that 17 Namibians had been killed in the DRC, including five in a helicopter collision in January, in which Nujoma's personal pilots died. Meanwhile, Nujoma played a prominent role in efforts towards a negotiated settlement, undertaking numerous visits to other countries of the region, and helping persuade Kabila to enter talks with the rebels, and Uganda to withdraw from the DRC. He continued to deny that there were any Namibian troops supporting the Angolan government against UNITA, but stated that, if requested, Namibia would assist under the auspices of SADC. In April Namibia signed a regional defence pact with Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe, providing for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against any of the signatories.

Relations with Botswana were further complicated from late 1998, when refugees began entering that country from Caprivi. Beginning in October a stream of refugees fled to Botswana, citing police harassment, after a man was reportedly killed at a secret military training base which the Namibian government alleged was being used by the secessionist Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM). The people of Caprivi had long sought closer links with their neighbours to the east, believing that the government in Windhoek was ignoring the development of their region because they did not support SWAPO. It emerged that the leading refugee figure was Mishake Muyongo, who had been forced out of SW APO in 1980 because of disagreement regarding the Caprivi issue, and had later become leader of the DTA.

In August 1998 the DTA's executive had in turn announced the suspension of Muyongo as party president, and dissociated the party from Muyongo's overt support for the secession of the Caprivi Strip. With 14 other members of the CLM, he sought, and was granted, asylum by the Botswana government in February 1999. Nujoma, who had at first sought the extradition of the refugees so that they could be tried as terrorists, made a state visit to Botswana in March 1999, during which he agreed with President Mogae that the secessionist leaders could be accorded refugee status, on condition that they be resettled in a third country; the remaining refugees, who by then numbered some 2,500; (including many San Bushmen); would be able to return without fear of punishment or persecution. This agreement was subsequently ratified by the two countries and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Muyongo and another leader of the movement, Boniface Mamili (a chief of the Mafwe) were granted political asylum in Denmark. In early August 1999, however, an unanticipated attack by members of what was styled the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) on the regional capital of Caprivi, Katima Mulilo, resulted in 12 deaths. The Namibian government imposed a state of emergency in Caprivi, and was offered support by Zimbabwe and Zambia against the separatists. The CLA, which had bases in western Zambia, was said to have close links with the separatist Barotse Patriotic Front in that country. It was widely suspected that UNITA had given the CLA military training and supported the attack because of the Namibian government's close ties with the MPLA government in Angola. Muyongo, stated to be the leader of the CLA, announced from Denmark that the episode marked the beginning of a war against the Namibian authorities, whom, he reasserted, had acted against the interests of the people of the region. The state of emergency was revoked in late August. At their March 1999 meeting, Presidents Nujoma and Mogae confirmed that Namibia and Botswana would each respect the judgment of the ICJ regarding sovereignty of Kasikili-Sududu. Submissions in the case had ended in February, and a ruling was expected later in the year. With the dispute having reached that stage, elements in the Namibian government considered that the issue of the southern border with South Africa should now be addressed: Namibia and South Africa disagreed as to whether the boundary followed the centre point of the Orange river, as well as to where the boundary line ran out to sea (and thus to diamond deposits).

Recent Political Developments

Unlike the DTA, it was not tainted with a history of collaboration with South Africa under apartheid. Apparently concerned as to the COD's prospects in the presidential and general election due in late 1999, Nujoma swiftly appointed two key figures from the labour movement as deputy ministers, and the government set aside N$255m. in the 1999/2000 budget for the social integration of about 9,000 former combatants, who were to be offered employment in the public service. A number were given posts in the police, and a national youth service scheme was also proposed. Meanwhile, in October 1998 the exceptional amendment to the constitution, allowing Nujoma to seek a third presidential term, was approved by the requisite two-thirds' majority in the national assembly, having received the support of SWAPO's members; the amendment was similarly endorsed by the national council in November. Of some concern was the in. creased apathy among voters, apparent in the regional council elections held in December, in which SWAPO won a majority in 11 of the 13 regional councils, thereby increasing its representation in the national council from 19 to 22 seats. Turn out by voters was only about 30%. The establishment of the COD suggested that the 1999 presidential and general election might generate more interest among voters. It was estimated that some 800,000Namibia's would participate in the forthcoming polls.

By 1999 infected more than 150,000 of Namibia's population of some 1.7m with the HIV virus. In April Namibia accepted,the SADC decision to make AIDS a notifiable disease.In the same month, the government abandoned plans for legislation, modelled on that in South Africa, to rlegalize abortion within the first three months of pregnancy (and under certain other conditions). A draft bill had been issued for public consultation in 1996, but opposition from church leaders had proved so strong that the government conceded defeat on the issue.